With far-right narratives becoming increasingly favoured in the United Kingdom, the topic of whether there is a relationship between immigration and violent crime has been subject to sustained political debate for quite some time. Immigrants, particularly asylum seekers, recent immigrants and low-skilled migrants are often constructed as key contributors to the rise of violent crime rates within the UK, causing public concern for the safety of the country in regard to its immigration policies. However, this notion of immigrants posing a threat to social stability and the country’s safety is more influenced by media representation and political rhetoric than by empirical evidence. In reality, the factors contributing to the increase of violent crime extend beyond immigration including socioeconomic inequality and deprivation. Furthermore, statistical evidence consistently shows that the majority of violent crime in the UK is committed by native-born citizens, challenging the assumption that immigration is a primary driver of violent criminal activity. Due to this, it is necessary to critically examine different angles surrounding violent crime. In my paper, I will argue that immigrants, namely asylum seekers, low skilled migrants and recent immigrants, have little to no direct impact on violent crime, which, under UK law, are defined as offences ‘ranging from assault to murder…also encompassing weapons’ (Crown Prosecution Services, n.d.). Rather, crime rates are more strongly shaped by structural factors such as poverty, socioeconomic inequality and deprivation. I will also argue that the public notion of there being a relation between immigration and violent crime is one influenced by media bias and political framing, rather than statistical fact.

Firstly, studies show there is little to no correlation between the intake of asylum seekers and violent crime rates. Stephen Bell, in his 2013 study examining immigration and crime in the UK, analyses long-term trends in migration and criminal activity, suggesting that there has been no effect on violent crime rates since the influx of people seeking asylum, which has been rising in the United Kingdom since 1998  (Bell, 2013), with spikes during periods of heightened international conflict (Jorgensen, 2025). Furthermore, available data suggests approximately 13% of convictions in the UK in 2024 are attributed to non-UK nationals, of which only 9% have been violent crimes (Sumption, 2025). British nationals account for the majority of the prison population, comprising approximately 88% of offenders, while foreign nationals represent a significantly smaller proportion at around 12% (Ministry of Justice, 2023). The population of people born outside the United Kingdom at the time of the UK national census 2021/22 was only 16%, and has been estimated to have increased since then, though no clear statistics as to how much (Cuibus, Migrants in the UK: An Overview, 2024). This challenges the dominant political narrative that positions migrants as a criminogenic threat, suggesting instead that perceptions of migrant criminality are socially constructed rather than empirically grounded. Additional evidence from the Ministry of Justice suggests that foreign nationals may even be slightly underrepresented relative to expectations, based on official projections. In the 2024 statistics, the number of predicted foreign nationals who will be convicted is higher than the number of foreign nationals who were actually convicted. Rather than immigration status, age is shown here to be a bigger indication of likelihood to commit crime (Sumption, 2025). Whilst the statistics shown have delved deeper than only violent crime, it is clear that immigrants are not overrepresented in committing violent crime or being convicted of crime. Rather, they are proportionate to the number of immigrants that make up the United Kingdom.

Bell instead suggests in his study that asylum seekers, low skilled migrants and recent immigrants often end up located in deprived areas due to cheaper housing and the dispersal policy (Bell et al., 2013). The dispersal policy refers to longer-term temporary accommodation managed by accommodation providers on behalf of the Home Office (Home Office, 2023), with evidence showing that asylum seekers under the dispersal policy were more likely to be located in deprived areas. The relevance of deprived areas to violent crime lies in the fact that deprived areas often result in higher rates of violent crime (Bell et al., 2013). This highlights inequalities in access to economic opportunities and social security among certain migrant groups. Whitworth, in his 2013 study analysing inequality and crime, examines structural factors influencing criminal behaviour, demonstrating a clear positive correlation between most forms of inequality and crime rates. He identifies commonly committed crimes and suggests various contributing factors, including high unemployment and lack of stability, such as weak family or social structures, or environments where crime is more socially accepted (2013, pp. 728-729). As suggested by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, lower education and vocational education and training lead to higher likelihood of unemployment (OECD, 2015, p. 34). This is later elaborated on when it is suggested that ‘youth from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds face greater difficulties at school and beyond, and are over represented in the groups of low performers’ (OECD, 2015, p. 38), showing the correlation between social deprivation, lower levels of education and employment, and therefore higher rates of violent crime. This is further suggested by UK Home Office, which state that local deprivation is a risk factor for serious violence (Home Office, 2018, p. 37). Statistics show that offences including violence are 3.5% – 4% more likely to occur in the 10% most income deprived areas as opposed to the 10% highest income areas.  In his book Causes of Delinquency, Travis Hirschi (2017) explores social bonding theory and its relationship to criminal behaviour, defining delinquency as repeated acts that would be punishable as crimes if committed by individuals over the statutory age. He suggests that weak social bonds—such as poor relationships with family, school, and peers—alongside boredom, lack of conventional activities, and weakened moral beliefs, contribute to higher crime rates (Hirschi, 2017, p. 65). This highlights the vast factors which contribute towards higher rates of violent crime, of which none mention immigration. As shown, these various factors are all intensified within deprived areas. These findings are particularly significant in the context of violent crime, as they are consistently identified as key drivers of serious violence (Home Office, 2018). Throughout studies, there is little evidence to suggest a correlation between immigration and crime rates, indicating that immigration itself is not a primary driver of violent crime in the United Kingdom.

This raises the question of how the perception that ‘immigration increases violent crime’ has developed. One key factor contributing to the blaming of immigrants for violent crime is media bias. Media bias can be understood as the selective presentation of information in a way that emphasises certain aspects of reality while omitting others (Entman, 1993). This process, often referred to as framing, shapes how audiences interpret events by making particular issues more salient. Within this context, this is reflected in the overrepresentation of immigrants as perpetrators of violent crime. Through the way media frames immigrants, harsher language is often used compared to their white British counterparts. According to the International Policy Institute, immigrants are often framed as ‘dangerous criminals’, and that ‘Britain is under attack from migrants, particularly asylum seekers and refugees’ (Cooper et al., 2021). The use of nationalistic language positions immigrants as outsiders, fostering prejudice despite the lack of empirical evidence linking immigration to crime. In another study, it is stated that the majority of articles referring to immigrants present them either as victims or villains, with 85% of articles making no direct reference to migrant voices (Crawley et al., 2016). This demonstrates a structural bias in media reporting, where immigrant perspectives are marginalised and narratives are constructed without their direct representation, creating a level of disconnect and unfamiliarity between UK nationals and immigrants. Furthermore, biased language often conflates terms such as ‘immigrant’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’, leading to associations with being ‘illegal’, ‘alien’ or not ‘high skilled’ (Kondor et al., 2021). It is important to distinguish between these groups, as they are often inaccurately categorised in public discourse despite differing legal and social statuses. The consistent use of negative language reinforces harmful stereotypes and contributes to rising levels of hostility, including racially motivated hate crimes (Home Office, 2025). An extensive study by Hebe Bourne examines anti-migrant narratives in the UK, suggesting that immigrants are often portrayed as ‘the other’, ‘deviants’ who diverge from social and moral order, and ‘easily available scapegoats’ for wider social and political issues, including the rise of violent crime (Bourne, 2024/2025, p. 32). She further highlights how headlines such as ‘Albanian gangs target UK mums-to-be’ are used as effective reader hooks, implicitly framing entire national groups as criminal (Bourne, 2024/2025, pp. 40–46). Subconsciously, readers may categorise such groups as ‘gang’ members, posing a perceived threat to innocent and vulnerable Britons. This can be understood through Stanley Cohen’s concept of moral panic, where media exaggerates the threat posed by certain groups, constructing them as ‘folk devils’ and amplifying public fear beyond statistical reality (Cohen, 1972, p. 2). In this context, migrants become symbolic threats, allowing complex social issues to be simplified and attributed to a single group. Blake (2019) similarly suggests that the dehumanisation of immigrants reduces empathy and facilitates the shifting of blame from broader structural or governmental issues onto migrants. His case studies demonstrate that when media includes humanising narratives of immigrants and refugees, readers develop greater empathy and connection. Simple changes in narrative can therefore influence public perception and reduce the overrepresentation of immigrants in discussions of violent crime. Overall, the evidence suggests that it is not immigration itself that increases violent crime, but rather the disproportionate media focus on isolated cases involving immigrants that shapes public perception and reinforces this misconception.

With the rising rates of far-right ideology in the United Kingdom, propaganda in regard to immigrants increasing violent crime is becoming more prominent. Some scholars argue that immigration may have localised impacts on crime in specific urban areas; however, these effects are inconsistent and often disappear when controlling for socioeconomic variables. They might argue that the idea ‘an alternate, “perfect” Britain [is] one where minority races and cultures are not part of the social community’, as suggested by Jackson. He explores the idea that to be patriotic is to be anti-immigration as a British ‘native’. (Jackson, 2012). This narrative is not supported by empirical evidence. They might use the statistic previously mentioned, Bell suggests a disproportionate level of immigrants end up in high violent crime rate deprived areas. For example, Pakistani ethnic groups (the biggest ethnic group to live in deprived areas) are three times more likely to live in the 10% most deprived areas than white British people (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2020). However, this analysis may be limited by its reliance on aggregated national data, which risks masking regional variations in crime and migration patterns. Violent crime rates in the UK do not appear to be significantly affected by the rate of immigration, with the number of immigrants convicted of crime being proportionate to the number of immigrants in the country, and rather the media presents immigrant crime disproportionately for reader hooks and political propaganda.

To conclude, this paper has demonstrated that immigration has little to no direct effect on violent crime rates in the United Kingdom. Instead, crime is more accurately explained by structural factors such as poverty and deprivation. Despite immigrants being disproportionately located in high-crime areas, statistical evidence shows they are not overrepresented in violent crime. The persistence of the belief that immigrants increase crime can therefore be attributed largely to media framing and political narratives, which construct migrants as ‘the other’ and position them as convenient scapegoats for broader social issues. Ultimately, the persistence of this misconception reflects not empirical reality, but the power of narrative in shaping public understanding of crime and social order.

References

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